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Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) in Latin America has been marked by a closed top-down process led by 
coalitions of politicians and technocrats who have chosen patronage relationships as the most convenient 
interaction with beneficiaries of social programmes. The existence of this type of relationship forces beneficiaries 
to take part in long-term political alliances in exchange for economic benefits. What seems to be a symbiotic 
relationship for the parties ultimately can have negative consequences in terms of democratic values and a 
financial opportunity cost to implement more efficient social investment. The more the exchange persists, the 
more permanent welfare dependency will prevail in the region. 
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PROGR AMAS DE TR ANSFERENCIAS CONDICIONADAS Y LA POLITIZ ACION  
DE LAS ESTR ATEGIAS DE REDUCCIÓN DE LA POBREZ A
RESUMEN
Los programas de transferencias monetarias condicionadas (CCT en inglés), en América Latina, se han 
caracterizado por emplear un enfoque cerrado de arriba hacia abajo, en donde las coaliciones entre políticos 
y tecnócratas han terminado por establecer un sistema de incentivos clientelistas como la interacción más 
conveniente con los beneficiarios de programas sociales. La existencia de este tipo de relaciones ha obligado 
a los beneficiarios a formar parte de alianzas políticas a largo plazo, a cambio de beneficios económicos. Lo 
que pareciera ser relación simbiótica para las partes, finalmente podría ser una relación con consecuencias 
negativas en términos de valores democráticos y un costo de oportunidad financiero para emprender otro 
tipo de inversiones sociales más eficientes. Entre más exista este tipo intercambio, mayor será la dependencia 
de este tipo de recursos en la región. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social policy and redistributive programmes in Latin America have traditionally failed to reach 
and benefit the poor (Díaz-Cayeros, Esteves, and Magaloni 2012). A generalized mood of disen-
chantment with the accomplishments of both left and right wing governments in social policy has 
been extended to almost all the region. 
Efforts to build a welfare state have been mainly associated with the idea of transferring social 
insurance benefits to the poor (Riesco 2007). However traditionally, public transfers have been 
targeted at those who participated in the formal labour market, excluding a large number of 
people from benefits and leading to the characterization of Latin America’s social assistance as a 
“truncated policy”1 (Skoufias, Shapiro, and Lindert 2006)the findings of this report reinforce the 
recommendations commonly made in the literature on social protection in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC. 
Nevertheless, in recent years social policy in the region has undergone a period of regeneration 
where new approaches, institutions, objectives and instruments have been put in place (Barrientos, 
Gideon, and Molyneux 2008). In a post-adjustment era, social policy has been pushed by a renewed 
“public attitude” (Graham 2002) oriented more towards interventions for tackling high levels of 
poverty and inequality, as development actors have incorporated a more open approach which 
considers that economic growth alone is not sufficient to reduce social gaps (ECLAC 2006). This 
period of change has seen the proliferation of cash or in-kind programmes for poor households 
as one of the most significant social policy innovations in recent years (Levy and Schady 2013). 
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs)2 were established in the mid 1990s as a replacement for less 
effective social benefits such as social housing programmes and price subsidies or reduced rates 
(ECLAC 2006). The theory of change proposed by CCTs lies in the idea that in the long term the 
combination of cash, conditions and complementary social benefits will enable people to escape 
from poverty. The ‘CCT wage’ (Fiszbein and Schady 2009), which started at the municipal level 
in Brazil, has been expanded and embraced enthusiastically by almost all countries in the region, 
with some variations with respect to scope, design, institutional arrangements and ultimate goals. 
So far, these programmes are showing positive effects in terms of school attendance and health 
and nutrition3. 
Despite the substantial amount of worked devoted to identifying the effects and impacts of 
CCTs – evaluative research -, little is known about how new social poverty reduction programmes 
are being co-opted for political and legislative agendas. CCTs’ popularity as a ‘magic bullet solu-
tion’ (Birdasall as cited in Dugger 2004) for development has re-launched the importance of social 
safety nets but at the same time has increased the patronage between incumbent political parties 
and beneficiaries. According to some it has also “induced a strong dependence on government 
handouts” (Hall 2008, p. 799). The experience has shown so far that the process of politicization 
1 Indeed, Lindert (2004) has denounced that the existence of a truncated social system in Latin America has created what he calls 
a ‘Reverse Robin Hood’ or a negative correlation between social spending, poverty and inequality. 
2 Conditional Cash Transfers are programmes that transfer cash to targeted poor people and have the aim of “breaking the inter-
generational transmission of poverty” (Thomas 2012, p. 1137). This type of programme transfers a stipend to households with 
the condition that they have to enroll their children in school and invest in health.
3 See (Coady 2001; Skoufias 2005; Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer 2009; Attanasio, Battistin, and Mesnard 2012).
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of CCTs often occurs in the selection of beneficiaries; in the selection of institutions and the staff 
who bring support to the programme; and during parliamentary and presidential elections, when 
incumbents manipulate voters in order to obtain political rewards (Adato and Hoddinott 2010). 
Although the politicization of this kind of programme may seem predictable, it is important to 
better understand how this process works. What kinds of mechanisms do development actors use 
to politicize social programmes? Has the clientelist relationship in social policy moved to a new 
partnership between politicians and citizens based on an entitlement-based social assistance regime 
(De La O 2013a)? Or rather, have CCTs contributed to the expansion of social systems based on 
clientelistic practices, excluding those who do not share particular partisan ideologies from benefits? 
1. GOVERNMENT WELFARE PROGRAMMES AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
a. Social policy formation
CCTs belong to a new era of social policy instruments. They are embedded in strategies that 
today consider social policy as an essential contributor to growth in productivity (Levy and Schady 
2013). At present, most of the literature on CCTs tends to focus on this aspect in an attempt to 
explain why welfare states should contemplate at least some programs with direct transfers to the 
poor within their social assistance approach. This trend in the literature contrasts with the few 
studies regarding how CCTs have become so popular with policy-makers. The arrival of CCTs in 
the domestic ‘policy space’ of Latin American governments invites us to consider aspects related 
to who is responsible for the design of these programmes and how welfare allocations are distri-
buted. Consequently, the formation of social policy determines how political interests affect the 
configuration of the social policy agenda thereby forcing welfare state theory to expand in terms 
of assumptions, configurations and outcomes. 
The development of the concept of the welfare state has been characterized by a surprising ab-
sence of a clear definition. Flora and Heidenheimer suggest that “welfare and state are among the 
most ambiguously employed terms in contemporary English political vocabulary” (1985 as cited in 
Cousins 2005, p. 4). Despite having this limitation, the relevant literature can be summarised into 
two different schools of thought. On the one hand, there is the structural approach of the ‘logic of 
industrialization’ (Kerr et al. 1960) and the conception of the modernization of societies4 (Flora and 
Heidenheimer 1981), which advocated for the need for strong social expenditure and a welfare 
state in order to create and secure the ‘emergent’ industrial labour force. And on the other hand, 
the welfare state is understood as a consequence of the alliance between the working classes and 
left wing parties (Korpi and Shalev 1979; Esping-Andersen 1985). This approach was developed by 
the Scandinavian school, giving rise to the term ‘Power Resources Theory’, and claims that social 
expenditure will be higher when well-organised labour movements can influence social-democratic 
and Labour parties (O’Connor and Olsen 1998).
Both theories emphasize the idea that determining the structure of the welfare state is, to a 
great extent, a dimension of the capacity of left wing or social democratic parties to mobilize and 
implement social policy. Indeed, welfare state theory has been shaped under the assumption that 
left wing political institutions are likely to carry out more social investment and reduce social in-
4 This process can be understood as the increasing differentiation between “individuals and household income, of working and 
living place and the evolution of social rights as a consequence of the institutionalization of political rights” (Flora and Heiden-
heimer 1981, p. 41).
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equality rather than other political parties. Nevertheless, these theories are insufficient to explain 
for example the rise of anti-poverty strategies in Latin America; particularly in the case of CCTs. 
Right wing governments have been central in the expansion and support of these programmes in 
the region, rather than those parties focusing on the welfare of workers.
In Peru the CCT program ‘Juntos’ was established by the centre-right government of Alejandro 
Toledo in 2005, and expanded by the right wing government of former president Alan Garcia, 
(Grompone 2006). In Colombia, the former far-right government of president Alvaro Uribe set up 
the CCT programme ‘Familias en Accion’ (FA) as a social strategy for Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) in 2011 (Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2014)5. 
Brazil is also a striking example. ‘Bolsa Escola’ was a school stipend introduced in 2001 in the 
Federal District (Cassidy et al. 2008), and later federalized by former president Fernando Enrique 
Cardoso, who was elected with the support of an alliance between the right wing Liberal Front 
Party, the Social Democracy Party and the Labour Party. Former president Lula inherited the 
CCT scheme and formed ‘Bolsa Familia’ as part of his ‘Fome Zero’ network of federal assistance 
programmes. These three cases challenge some of the commonly held ideas relating to principles 
of welfare state and provide alternative explanations for the increasing popularity of CCT schemes 
among governments in Latin America. 
These examples help to underline that CCTs, as a new configuration of social policy in Latin 
America, have entered the political agenda as a result of different institutional incentives. The 
‘new social policy’, which some scholars (Barrientos, Gideon, and Molyneux 2008) argue is created 
through a process of bottom-up pressure, seems not to fit well in the case of CCTs, as policy for-
mation in this case is strongly influenced by factors of a top-down dynamic in public policy, where 
the implementation is managed from political elites to lower units of administration.
b. Politicians and technocrats as ‘elite coalitions’
De la O (2013a) contends that the introduction, and consequently expansion, of CCT schemes in 
Latin American is in part explained by the progressively active role of technocrats6 as the principal 
state bureaucrats in Latin American governments. The modernization of social sector manage-
ment, seen in terms of a variety of instruments and capacities in implementation and leadership, 
has been induced by the existence of independent policy makers, who set technical priorities with 
certain autonomy from political interest groups. Moreover, the domestic policy agenda has also 
been affected by the existence of international high-profile experts –often linked with internatio-
nal financial organizations -, who share knowledge within an ‘epistemic community’7 (Haas 1992) 
and, ultimately, influence and shape the public policy cycle8. Technocrats have traditionally been 
involved in the process of policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. The phases of public 
policy of agenda setting, legitimation and policy maintenance have been more in the domain of 
5 The programme started by targeting 400,000 households in 2001. At the end of Uribe’s second government, the programme 
was targeting around 1.5 million households by 2007 (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). 
6 This essay interprets technocrats as those “individuals with a high level of specialized academic training which serves as a prin-
cipal criterion on the basis of which they are selected to occupy key decision making or advisory roles” (Collier 1979, p. 403).
7 Hass (1992) introduces the concept of epistemic communities as “networks of knowledge-based experts” (p. 2), which “recognize 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain 
or issue area” (p. 3)
8. The policy cycle assumes six main stages: Agenda setting; Policy formulation; Legitimation; Implementation; Evaluation, and 
Policy maintenance, succession or termination (Cairney 2012). 
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politicians as they entail power relations and negotiation with interest groups. 
CCT programmes are good examples of how technical policy makers have determined the 
characteristics (beneficiaries, allocation and resources) and the development of policy (scope, 
objectives and outcomes) as part of antipoverty strategies. The introduction of the approach of 
evidence-based policy –or “use policies that work” (Cartwright and Hardie 2012, p. ix), has led 
to increased interest in the process of evaluation as an essential instrument to determine under 
which conditions CCTs are more likely to bring about positive results. The shift from opinion-based 
policies towards more rigorous rational approaches based on evidence (Sutcliffe and Court 2005) 
has enabled governments to access more comprehensive information, allowing them to assess a 
greater variety of policy alternatives. Indeed, a large portion of current CCTs have been evaluated 
(Fiszbein and Schady 2009; World Bank 2011), which has meant an increase in their adoption and 
popularity as social policies for Latin American governments.  
The adoption and implementation of CCTs is also associated with the administrative capacity 
of state technical agencies (Teichman 2007), and the ability to absorb increasing international fi-
nancial support in these types of programmes. Latin America’s social policy formation experience 
has shown that the more autonomy is provided to technocrats, the more likely they are to design, 
implement and adapt a CCT programme. However, this technical autonomy, in turn, has resulted 
in the development of strong centralized bureaucracies that are characterised by top-down policy 
processes. In some cases, the formation of CCT programmes in the region has been a “business 
of poverty experts rather than grassroots organizations or the poor themselves” (Martinez and 
Voorend 2011).
This can be seen in the process of decentralization that has been implemented systematically 
in the region for more than two decades (Falleti 2010) through reforms in the institutional, fis-
cal and political aspects of policy making. The decentralization process was intended to provide 
greater fiscal resources and political autonomy to local regions and municipalities, however the 
results have been varied across the region. In the case of antipoverty programmes such as CCTs, 
the transfer of autonomy has usually come with conditions from central agencies that consider it 
difficult to delegate to counterparts and have opted for contracting external experts or consultants 
to implement these programmes.
A similar situation occurs even when local authorities are implementing social programmes. 
Although the decentralization of competencies has led to the development of certain roles and 
responsibilities at the micro level, which has contributed to strengthening local ownership to some 
extent; the proliferation of CCTs has been accompanied by a greater centralization in political and 
economic decision-making, thereby diminishing and hampering local capacities. From this point of 
view, CCTs within the context of decentralization pose challenges related to the ‘principal-agent’ 
dilemma (or information asymmetry between the central agency and the implementation offices), 
heterogeneous quality in implementation (different capacity and managerial standards between 
actors), and the possibility of overlapping and producing potential duplication with other decen-
tralized social programmes (Linder et al. 2007).
Additionally, the coalition of technocrats and politicians in the design of CCTs often includes 
regional ‘caciques electorales’ or provincial political bosses, who influence local public policies and 
mobilize votes (Brun and Diamond 2014). Under these circumstances, incumbent coalitions and 
local legislators reduce the effectiveness of social programmes through misallocation of resources, 
in addition to increasing the potential to politicize programmes. 
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In this sense CCT programmes can be considered as technical initiatives that fall under the 
sphere of influence of technocrats rather than politicians. However, the adoption of CCTs as an 
antipoverty programme has been led by the coexistence of technocrats and politicians within diffe-
rent types of coalitions, which to some extent has limited participation in social policy formation in 
general, and in CCTs, in particular (p. 288). Regardless of divergent partisan ideologies, technocrats 
and politicians have established elite coalitions in order to develop social policy in line with their 
economic and political aspirations, defining “themselves as subjects of privilege” (Filgueira 2005, 
p. 4). In these circumstances, social programmes such as CCTs have served the aims of coalitions 
by politicizing social demands and defining the conditions for access to these programmes. 
II. THE POLITICIZATION OF ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMMES
a. Voting behaviour and political manipulation
Models of voting behaviour have stated that political parties design policies “strictly as a means of 
gaining votes” (Downs 1957, p. 137), where their primary interest is to formulate policies with the aim 
of remaining in power, rather than “seek to gain office in order to serve any particular interest group 
or to carry out certain preconceived policies” (p. 137). The sequence of events here is very important, 
as it determines the success of the incumbent in maximizing the number of votes to maintain in ‘office’. 
Social policy is an interesting field within which to analyse possible links between expansions of 
anti-poverty programmes and incumbents remaining in power. It is necessary to examine whether 
programmes such as CCTs have been captured under studies of electoral behaviour and conse-
quently if they have become an economic instrument to manipulate individual electoral choices. 
Before embarking on this analysis it is important to define the concept of politicization. Initially, 
the politicization of antipoverty programmes can be understood as symptomatic of a healthy poli-
tical system. Decision-makers escalate social problems into the political agenda through a process 
of political awareness. Issues such as fulfilment of labour standards, access and quality of education 
or improvement in national health systems would not be part of public contention and debate if 
a politicization process had not been in place. Furthermore, a proper politicization process con-
tributes to the functioning of a democratic system, ensuring appropriate checks and balances as it 
introduces “new demands for resources, justice, or recognition” (Calhoun 2002). 
However, the concept of politicization should be nuanced. Public choice theory considers that 
public policy is likely to be governed by individual interests, which makes it prone to politicization 
(Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock 1980). In the context of strong clientelistic relations, the align-
ment between politicians and technocrats increases the likelihood of corruption (Huber 1996) and 
increases the appearance of “rent-seeking and inefficient targeting by brokers” (S. C. Stokes et al. 
2013, p. 21). In this sense, politicization in social assistance ultimately leads to more exclusion and 
more opportunities to undermine long-term policies. 
In the case of Latin America, politicization seems to have some roots in the connection between 
elections and social safety nets. Social policy has been sensitive to voters who are particularly suscep-
tible to targeted fiscal allocation, which encourages incumbents to use incentives –e.g. CCTs- “before 
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elections to influence electoral outcomes”9 (Drazen and Eslava 2006. p, 1). It could be considered 
that this kind of phenomenon occurs in all democratic electoral systems, regardless of the type of 
country which is under analysis. However, the aim of targeting specific voters across specific bene-
fits - commonly labelled also as ‘pork barrel politics’-, in order to acquire political support, seems 
to be more common in ‘new’ democracies, rather than in ‘established’ democracies (Brender and 
Drazen 2004). These two remarks suggest a potential politicization of the way social programmes 
are identified and implemented, as well as the existence of trade-offs between ideological attach-
ment and public targeting policies (Nupia 2011). 
Incumbents normally view electoral politics as a mechanism of ‘tactical redistribution’ of social 
policy (Dixit and Londregan 1996) between different types of voters in their constituencies. Likewise, 
voters can also attract antipoverty programmes to their district of influence if there is a predomi-
nance of non-partisan voters. Therefore, voting behaviour framework can be very illustrative in 
understanding how political incentives target voters in an attempt to reduce the trade-off between 
different ideological interests and increasing voter turnout. 
On the one hand, Cox and McCubbins (1986) sort the electorate into three types of voters – 
support groups, swing voters and opposition voters - and consider that coalitions are more keen to 
transfer social allocations to those who are more loyal to their political priorities. The existence of a 
shared bias between voters and candidate, referred to by the authors as the “adherence dimension”, 
means that the incumbent is more prone to risk-adverse strategies and, consequently, to allocating 
social benefits to the most loyal supporters in order to maximize electoral support (Díaz-Cayeros, 
Esteves, and Magaloni 2012). In contrast to this voter model, scholars like Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1987), and Dixit and Londregan (1996) have added to the debate contending that instead of 
offering support to core voters, coalitions should focus mainly on swing voters10 as a transfer of an 
antipoverty scheme can make the difference in attracting indifferent voters. 
Although these models represent distinct strategies to influence individual voting choices, 
they are similar in the sense that they highlight the fact that political coalitions often co-opt the 
development of social policy. The manipulation of social spending through clientelistic exchanges 
is becoming a ‘normal’ practice, which is understood as a legitimate lobbying strategy in order to 
garner support from poor beneficiaries (S. Stokes 2005). Following this line of the argument, it 
would be possible to argue that the current configuration of CCTs exists within a non-zero-sum 
framework as coalitions and beneficiaries, ultimately, will obtain rewards -votes for the incumbent, 
and access to benefits for the participants of social programmes, respectively. 
From the perspective of beneficiaries, incentives offered by antipoverty programmes are a way 
“to infer the competence of politicians and their preferences for redistribution” (Baez et al. 2012, p. 
1). Policy choices in relation to CCTs are directly affecting beneficiaries’ behaviour and encouraging 
them to stay within programmes. In Oportunidades, the cash transfer is “equivalent to over 40 percent 
of household income in the lowest quintile of the distribution” (Levy and Schady 2013) encouraging 
beneficiaries to ‘re-apply’ constantly and potentially providing disincentives to move out of the target 
9 This phenomenon is referred to in political economy literature as the “political business cycle”. This process is based on the idea 
that incumbents often increase social expenditure before elections in order to secure votes and increase the probability of being 
re-elected (Brender and Drazen 2004). For further discussion on voting behavior, social expenditure and electoral outcomes 
see Fair 1976; Lewis-Beck 1990. 
10 Cox and McCubbins define swing voters as “those who have been neither consistently supportive nor consistently hostile” 
(1986, p. 376).
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group. 
Likewise, CCTs can contribute to the reproduction of the phenomenon of vote-buying. 
Although the introduction of secret balloting has reduced opportunities for politicians to buy 
votes (Schaffer 2007), the existence of promises of social benefits increases voters’ tendency to 
maintain a commitment with the political party that provides the benefit. Finan and Schechter 
(2011) tested this argument using a dataset on vote-buying in a municipal election in Paraguay 
finding that “voters who are offered money or material goods in exchange for their votes reci-
procate because they experience pleasure in increasing the material payoffs of people who have 
helped them” (p. 1). This suggests that beneficiaries of CCTs are not only more likely to vote 
for the politician or party from which they accepted the benefit, but are also more likely to be 
involved in a vote-buying scenario11. 
Thus, the decision of who should receive the transfer seems to be more political than economic. 
Elite coalitions are governed by political interests that directly influence the allocation of CCTs, 
affecting the number and nature of the beneficiaries in the programmes. 
b. Evidence of CCTs’ electoral returns 
The points discussed above have provided inputs to understand theoretically how the implemen-
tation of CCTs in the region has helped incumbents to obtain political rewards. Evidence from the 
region also supports this claim. This section will examine the cases of Mexico, Brazil and Colombia 
to illustrate how CCTs have contributed to politicizing social policy in the region.
In terms of the effect of electoral results on the implementation of CCTs in the region, some 
empirical research has shown a positive relationship between the probability of casting a ballot in 
favour of the incumbent and being a beneficiary of a CCT programme. One of the first evaluations 
of the issue states how in the case of Mexico, beneficiaries from the Progresa programme were “26% 
more likely to vote for the incumbent (PRI12) candidate” (Cornelius as cited in De La O, 2013b, p. 
4) than other candidates of different parties. 
Increased levels of political participation can also be linked with the existence of CCTs in a 
specific region. Data from Mexico confirm that beneficiaries exhibit feelings of reciprocity towards 
incumbents who administer CCT programmes as they demand handouts from state agencies, which 
in some degree are aligned with their social and economic expectations. Cornelius (2004) found 
a relationship between ‘buying votes’ and the decision to cast a vote for the incumbent. Using a 
panel data study, Cornelius’ results show how during the presidential election of 2000 in Mexico, 
37% of voters, who received a ‘gift’ (or promise of enrolment into social programmes) from the 
incumbent party, voted for the party’s presidential candidate. It is important to stress here that it 
is also likely that the reciprocity or obligation that voters have with the incumbents is also related 
to the fear of losing coverage as a beneficiaries of the programmes (Baez et al. 2012).
In a similar study, Díaz-Cayeros, Esteves and Magaloni (2012) suggest that programmatic 
initiatives like CCTs have an influence on the way voters change their partisan choices. In the 
11 The evidence also suggests that coalitions try to cheat more in the design of social programmes than during pre-electoral periods, 
as more and stronger verification processes are in place (Camacho and Conover 2011). 
12 In English, The Institutional Revolutionary Party. 
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case of Oportunidades13 in Mexico, traditional left wing voters voted for the right wing candidate 
Felipe Calderon (PAN14) in 2006 in order to obtain benefits from the programme. The study 
shows that voters enrolled in Oportunidades “were 11% more likely to vote for PAN’s Calderon 
than non-beneficiaries” (p. 223) of the CCT programme. In this sense, political affiliation is a 
conditional trait that can be manipulated by the kind of social policy implemented (Fiorina 1977). 
In fact, in the case of Mexico, CCT programmes have been customised to attract specific kinds 
of voters with the aim of generating particular partisan identifications (Díaz-Cayeros, Esteves, 
and Magaloni 2012). 
CCT programmes in Brazil display similar trends in how incumbents diversify their political 
constituencies. The second election of former president Lula in 2006 registered a huge difference 
between the developed regions and poorer areas’ voting behaviour. Hunter and Power (2007) 
contend that “the cash injection from the poverty-reduction income transfer of the Bolsa Familia 
Programme played a central role in returning Lula to the presidency” (p. 16) through an overwhel-
ming victory at the polls. In fact, Lula’s political vision of grassroots mobilization of workers was 
re-launched under an expansion of Bolsa Familia from 11 to 13 million households in an attempt 
that could be considered as a political manoeuvre for improving the tarnished image of the gover-
nment, after the scandals of corruption of 200515. 
The effect that the expansion of the Bolsa Familia programme had was to increase the probabi-
lity of voting for Lula across several income brackets. According to Zucco (2009), the lowest family 
income group (of those who were enrolled in the programme) voting in the presidential elections 
of 2006 were 35% more likely to vote for the incumbent, followed by 45% and 63% for the next 
two groups of the income scale (p. 23).
In line with this evidence, the CCT programme Familias en Accion (FA) in Colombia also illus-
trates a pattern of the politicization of social policy. This is a large scale CCT programme, which 
was set up in 2001 with the aim of supporting the poorest households in municipalities with less 
than 100,000 inhabitants (Attanasio, Battistin, and Mesnard 2012). The programme has been ex-
panded constantly in terms of numbers of beneficiaries, including larger towns in recent years (p. 
99). At the present, FA is the largest antipoverty programme being implemented in Colombia. In a 
quasi-experimental evaluation, Nupia (2011) assesses the political motives behind the allocation of 
FA across different Colombian municipalities. The evaluation found that the re-election of former 
president Alvaro Uribe 2006-2010 (62% of total votes in first-round) was in part achieved because 
of the electoral promise to expand the FA programme in a second term. Nupia concludes that “an 
increment of 12.5 points in the FA beneficiary rate in a municipality increases the incumbent’s vote 
share by one percentage point” (p. 5). 
Beneficiary manipulation through social policy is also evident in the Colombian experience. 
In 2004, the Constitutional Court of Colombia enacted the sentence T-025, which demanded 
the enrolment of Internally Displaced People into the FA programme. According to the interna-
13 Oportunidades is the current antipoverty programme of the Mexican government established in 2002, based on the previous 
CCT programme called Progresa. 
14 In English, National Action Party. 
15 In 2005, Lula’s government faced allegations of clandestine monthly payments made for the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 
Worker’s party) to members of the Brazilian congress in return for support for its legislative agenda. (“What Is Brazil’s ‘Mensa-
lão’?” 2013). In this regard, Hunter and Power (2007) point out that the negative consequences of the mensalão scandal make 
Lula’s presidential victory in 2006 even more remarkable (p. 2). This leads one to consider that among the reasons for Lula’s 
re-election might be the expansion of CCT programmes in Brazil. 
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tional NGO, Global Exchange (n.d.) the increase in the number of beneficiaries resulted in an 
improvement in the electoral position of the incumbent coalition parties. In an extensive report, 
the NGO claims that the coalition government, formed by the Social Party of National Unity 
and the Colombian Conservative Party obtained 76% and 56% more votes in the parliamentary 
and presidential elections respectively compared to results obtained in 2006. Opposition parties 
have raised concerns regarding the legality of giving exclusive managerial control over large 
amounts of public resources to the government (De La O 2013a; Brun and Diamond 2014) as 
well as allegedly exercising control over IDPs to form a so-called ‘network of informants’, whose 
main goal is to denounce guerrillas and paramilitary locations in order to receive benefits from 
the programme (Hunt 2006).
These examples demonstrate that the incumbent governing coalition increased its vote share in 
areas where CCT programmes had been expanded (Baez et al. 2012). Moreover, the use of CCTs 
as ‘pork barrel’ initiatives by the incumbent, makes district and municipalities progressively more 
dependent on the decisions of political coalitions, and “thereby creates opportunities for clientelistic 
exchange” (Brun and Diamond 2014, p. 107).
CONCLUSION
This essay has provided some insights into the expansion of CCTs’ in Latin America arguing 
that their popularity lies in the political benefits that they bring to elite policymakers. The use of 
CCTs encourages political participation, which is used strategically by incumbents to mobilize and 
diversify their political portfolio (Robinson and Verdier 2013). 
CCT programmes in Latin America have taken on the character of discretional antipoverty 
strategies that have becoming useful for incumbent parties in winning elections. Irrespective of 
the ideological nature of political parties, policymakers have increasingly used CCTs as a central 
modality in social policy. The design and implementation of CCTs have been dominated by elite 
coalitions, mainly formed by politicians and national and international technocrats, who have been 
focused on targeting antipoverty programmes with the aim of leveraging swing voter groups and 
obtaining political rewards, rather than using CCTs as a “universal, coordinated and inclusive social 
policy” (Martinez and Voorend 2011, p. 282).
Incumbents have used CCTs in a deliberate strategy to increase constituencies as the political elec-
toral competition has increased in intensity. They have opted to implement social policy in locations 
where there is a high concentration of swing voters who are potentially more likely to turn towards 
incumbent partisan ideology if there are particular social benefits involved. As a consequence, the co-
option of CCTs by elite coalitions has contributed to the use of clientelism in order to obtain important 
electoral returns for incumbents. No less important, on the other side of the equation beneficiaries 
respond positively to vote-buying because it secures their place in future phases or the expansion of the 
programme. Ultimately, a system of handouts and reciprocity is reproduced in each election period. 
The evidence found in the implementations of CCTs in the region suggests that incumbents 
often make use of antipoverty programmes in order to gain political affiliates (voters) and retain 
political power for future elections. The absence of random design in the implementation of CCTs 
has enabled coalitions to use social programmes for political purposes (Nupia 2011). In the cases of 
Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, CCTs have produced significant electoral payoffs for the incumbent 
parties that have decided to implement them. Thus, the administration of CCTs can lead to a decrease 
in political competition as the incumbent has advantages over other parties (e.g. opposition) during 
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election periods because it is able to affect the voting behaviour of beneficiaries directly. Likewise, 
the excessive use of CCTs as political instruments can encourage policy makers to limit the use of 
other strategies for poverty alleviation, which can be equally effective and that today are neglected 
by incumbents as instruments of social policy because they have limited rewards in political terms. 
Despite the criticisms that can be raised regarding how governments have used CCTs as instru-
ments of politicization of social policy, it is important to recognise some positive outcomes. CCTs 
have contributed to making citizens more aware of the relative efficacy of antipoverty programmes 
in relation to their economic and social conditions. The evidence gathered so far shows that the 
establishment of CCT programmes has effects on electoral results, and consequently on the politici-
zation of social programmes as incumbents can use them as strategies to remain in power. However, 
in the context of new social policy, it seems that incumbents can only remain in power through the 
implementation of successful social policy; otherwise voters will allocate their preferences to other 
more promising social policy offers (Finan and Schechter 2011). Ultimately this may ensure that 
the technical politicization of social policy can lead not only to better antipoverty programmes but 
also to limiting the advance of populist governments in Latin America (Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 
2009) who use CCTs as political rewards. 
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